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ABSTRACT
Tor is among most well-known dark net in the world. It has noble
uses, including as a platform for free speech and information dis-
semination under the guise of true anonymity, but may be culturally
beer known as a conduit for criminal activity and as a platform
to market illicit goods and data. Past studies on the content of
Tor support this notion, but were carried out by targeting popular
domains likely to contain illicit content. A survey of past studies
may thus not yield a complete evaluation of the content and use of
Tor. is work addresses this gap by presenting a broad evaluation
of the content of the English Tor ecosystem. We perform a compre-
hensive crawl of the Tor dark web and, through topic and network
analysis, characterize the ‘types’ of information and services hosted
across a broad swath of Tor domains and their hyperlink relational
structure. We recover nine domain types dened by the informa-
tion or service they host and, among other ndings, unveil how
some types of domains intentionally silo themselves from the rest
of Tor. We also present measurements that (regreably) suggest
how marketplaces of illegal drugs and services do emerge as the
dominant type of Tor domain. Our study is the product of crawling
over 1 million pages from 20,000 Tor seed addresses, yielding a
collection of over 150,000 Tor pages. We make a dataset of the
intend to make the domain structure publicly available as a dataset
at hps://github.com/wsu-wacs/TorEnglishContent.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e deep web denes content on the World Wide Web that cannot
or has not yet been indexed by search engines. Services of great in-
terest to parties that want to be anonymous online is a subset of the
deep web called dark nets: networks running on the Internet that re-
quire unique application layer protocols and authorization schemes
to access. While many dark nets exist (i.e. I2P [8], Rie [17], and
Freenet [9]), Tor [34] has emerged as the most popular [33, 40]. It
is used as a tool for circumventing government censorship [24], for
releasing information to the public [21], for sensitive communica-
tion between parties [36, 39], and as an (allegedly) private space to
buy and sell goods and services [25, 32].
It is an open question whether the fundamental and oen nec-
essary protections that Tor provides its users is worth its cost: the
same features that protect the privacy of virtuous users also make
Tor an eective means to carry out illegal activities and to evade law
enforcement. Various positions on this question have been docu-
mented [16, 22, 30], but empirical evidence is limited to studies that
have crawled, extracted, and analyzed specic subsets of Tor based
on the type of hosted information, such as drug tracking [12],
homemade explosives [20], terrorist activities [7], or forums [39].
A holistic understanding of how Tor is utilized and its structure
as an information ecosystem cannot be gleamed by surveying this
body of past work. is is because previous studies focus on a
particular subset of this dark web and take measurements that aim
to answer unique collections of hypotheses. But such a holistic un-
derstanding of Tor’s utilization and ecosystem is crucial to answer
broader questions about this dark web, such as: How diverse is the
information and the services provided on Tor? Is the argument that
the use of Tor to buy and sell illicit goods and services and to enable
criminal activities valid? Is the domain structure of Tor ‘siloed’, in
the sense that the Tor domain hyperlink network is highly modular
conditioned on content? Does the hyperlink network between domains
exhibit scale-free properties? Answers to such questions can yield
an understanding of the kinds of services and information available
on Tor, reveal the most popular and important (from a structural
perspective) services it provides, and enable a comparison of Tor
against the surface web and other co-reference complex systems.
Towards this end, we present a quantitative characterization
of the types of information available across a large swath of Eng-
lish language Tor webpages. We conduct a massive crawl of Tor
starting from 20,000 dierent seed addresses and harvest only the
html page of each visited address1. Our crawl encompasses over
1 million addresses, of which 150,473 are hosted on Tor and the
remaining 1,085,960 returns to the visible web. We focus on 40,439
Tor pages belonging to 3,347 English language domains and aug-
ment LDA with a topic-labeling algorithm that uses DBpedia to
assign semantically meaningful labels to the content of crawled
pages. We further extract and study a logical network of English Tor
domains connected by hyperlinks. We limit our study to the subset
of Tor domains with information wrien in English in an aempt
1For privacy purposes no embedded resources of any kind, including images, scripts,
videos, or other multimedia, were downloaded in our crawl.
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to control for any variability in measurements and insights that
could be caused by the conuence of information posted in unique
languages, structure, and possibly unique subdomains of Tor (for
example, VPN services specically targeting users in countries with
government controlled censorship or marketplaces exclusively for
users living in a particular country). We summarize our insights to
the following research questions:
• RQ1: Is the information and services of Tor diverse?
– We nd that Tor services can be described by just
nine types. Over 50% of all domains discovered are
either directories to other Tor domains, or serve as
marketplaces to buy and sell goods and services. Just
24% of all Tor domains are used to publicly post, pri-
vately send, or to discover information anonymously.
We do nd, however, that dierent types of domains
relate to each other in unique ways, including market-
places that enable payment by forcing gameplay on
a gambling site, and that domains involving money
transactions have a surprisingly weak reliance to Tor
Bitcoin domains.
• RQ2: What are the ‘core’ services of Tor? Is there even a core?
– An importance analysis from some centrality metrics
nds the Dream market to be the most structurally
important, “core” service Tor provides by a wide mar-
gin. e Dream market is the largest marketplace for
illicit goods and services on Tor. Directory sites to
nd and access Tor domains have dominant between-
ness centrality, making them important sources for
Tor browsing.
• RQ3: How siloed are Tor information sources and services?
– A connectivity analysis shows how Tor services tend
to isolate themselves which makes them dicult to
discover by simple browsing and implies the need for
a comprehensive seed list of domains for data collec-
tion on Tor. We also nd paerns suggesting com-
petitive and cooperative behavior between domains
depending on their domain type, and that Tor is not
particularly introspective: few news domains refer-
ence a large number of other domains across this dark
web.
• RQ4: How can the structure of Tor domain hyperlinks be
modeled? What are the implications of Tor’s domain connec-
tivity?
– We nd that the hyperlink network of Tor domains
does not follow the scale-free structure observed in
other sociotechnological systems or the surface web.
Also, investigating within content communities de-
notes a power-tailed paern in the in-degree distribu-
tions of about half of all Tor domains.
To the best of our knowledge, this study reports on the largest
measurements of Tor taken to date, and is the rst to study the
relationship between Tor domains conditioned on the type of in-
formation they hold. We publish the hyperlink structure of this
massive dataset to the public at: hps://github.com/wsu-wacs/
TorEnglishContent. Contrasting our ndings for subsets of Tor
wrien in other languages will be an exciting direction for future
work.
is paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related
work on characterizing and evaluating Tor. Section 3 presents
the procedure used for data collection and processing. Section 4
provides an evaluation on Tor content while Section 5 describes
the logical network of the domains connected by hyperlinks and
presents the analyses results. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the
main conclusions and discusses the future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
Previous research on Tor have focused on characterizing partic-
ular types of hosted content, on trac-level measurements, and
on understanding the security, privacy, and topological properties
of Tor relays at the network layer. Towards understanding types
of content on Tor, Dolliver et al. use geovisualizations and ex-
ploratory spatial data analyses to analyze distributions of drugs and
substances advertised on the Agora Tor marketplace [12]. Chen
et al. seek an understanding of terrorist activities by a method
incorporating information collection, analysis, and visualization
techniques from 39 Jihad Tor sites [7]. Mo¨rch et al. analyze 30
Tor domains to investigate the accessibility of information related
to suicide [29]. Dolliver et al. crawls Silk Road 2 with the goal of
comparing its nature in drug tracking operations with that of
the original site [11]. Dolliver et al. also conduct an investigation
on psychoactive substances sold on Agora and the countries sup-
porting this dark trade [13]. Other related works propose tools to
support the collection of specic information, such as a focused
crawler by Iliou et al. [20], new crawling frameworks for Tor by
Zhang et al. [39], and advanced crawling and indexing systems like
LIGHTS by Ghosh et al. [15].
Tor trac monitoring is another related area of work. is
monitoring is oen done to detect security risks and information
leakage on Tor that can compromise the anonymity of its users
and the paths packets take. Mohaisen et al. study the possibility
of observing Tor requests at global DNS infrastructure that could
threaten the private location of servers hosting Tor sites, such
as the name and onion address of Tor domains [28]. McCoy et
al. study the clients using and routers that are a part of Tor by
collecting data from exit routers [26]. Biryukov et al. analyze the
trac of Tor hidden services to evaluate their vulnerability against
deanonymizing and take down aacks. ey demonstrate how to
nd the popularity of a hidden service, harvest their descriptors in a
short time, and nd their guard relays. ey further propose a large-
scale aack to disclose the IP address of a Tor hidden service [2]. We
consider such work, operating at the trac level, as studying Tor
payloads that pass through networks, rather than in understanding
the content of these payloads or of the inter-connected structure of
Tor domains.
e topological properties of Tor, at physical and logical levels,
are only beginning to be studied. Xu et al. quantitatively evalu-
ated the structure of four terrorist and criminal related networks,
one of which is from Tor [37]. ey nd such networks are e-
cient in communication and information ow, but are vulnerable
to disruption by removing weak ties that connect large connected
components. Sanchez-Rola et al. conducted a broader structural
2
Figure 1: Tor data collection process
analysis over 7,257 Tor domains [33]. eir experiments indicate
that domains are logically organized in a sparse network, and nds
a surprising relation between Tor and the surface web: there are
more links from Tor domains to the surface web than to other Tor
domains. ey also nd evidence to suggest a surprising amount
of user tracking performed on Tor. Part of this work extends their
study by examining the structure between Tor domains conditioned
on the type of information they host.
3 DATASET COLLECTION AND PROCESSING
We performed a comprehensive crawl of the Tor network to extract
data for this study. Figure 1 illustrates this data collection process.
We developed a multi-threaded crawler that collects the html of
any Tor website reachable by a depth rst search (up to depth 4)
starting from a seed list of 20,000 Tor addresses. is seed list was
constructed by concatenating the list used in a recent study [33]
along those identied by the author’s manual search of Reddit ,
Quora, and Ahima, and other major surface web directories in the
days predating the crawl. Although a manual list of seeds runs the
inevitable risk of a crawl that can miss portions of Tor, the hidden
nature of Tor websites make it unlikely for there to ever be a single
authoritative directory of Tor domains. We are condent that our
seed list leads to a comprehensive crawl of Tor because: (i) e
Reddit, ora, Ahima, and surface web directories are well-known
for providing up to date links to Tor domains and are oen used
by Tor users to begin their own searches for information. is
suggest that these entry points into Tor are at worst practically
useful, and at best are ideal starting points to search and nd Tor
domains associated with the most common uses of the service; (ii)
e list adapted from [33] are noted to be sources commonly utilized
to discover current Tor addresses. Furthermore, we assign our
crawlers to cover all hyperlinks up to depth 4 from every seed page
to make our data collection as comprehensive as possible. Out seed
list is published online.2
Because of the rapidly changing content and structure of Tor [33],
including temporary downtime for some domains, we executed two
crawls 30 days apart from each other in June and July 2018. To
try to control for some variability in the up and down time of do-
mains, the union of the Tor sites captured during the two crawls
were stored for subsequent analysis. It is worth noting that we
only request html and follow hyperlinks, and do not download
the full content of a web page. is prevents any access control
2hps://github.com/wsu-wacs/TorEnglishContent/blob/master/seeds
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Figure 2: LDA topic coherence score for dierent number of
topic and minimum lengths of document; bold trend repre-
senting scores using 9 topics
polices, request rate limiters, and crawler blockers from interrupt-
ing our data collection. A total of 1,236,433 distinct pages were
captured across both crawls. e collected data was post-processed
to identify English pages and to classify the crawled pages as being
from the surface or from Tor. Any webpage with sux .onion was
classied as a Tor page, while the remainder are considered to be
from the surface web. A language identication method proposed
by [14] was used to remove non-English onion pages based on their
text content regardless of the value set in their HTML language tag.
40,439 English Tor pages remained aer this ltering. We chose to
only focus on English pages to facilitate our content analysis; an
evaluation of non-English pages will be the topic of future work.
3.1 Tor content discovery and labeling
We subjected the corpus of English Tor pages through an unsu-
pervised content discovery and labeling procedure. e process
runs the content of every Tor page (where content is dened as
any string outside of a markdown tag) through the Latent Dirichlet
Allocation (LDA) [4] and Graph-based Topic Labeling (GbTL) [19]
algorithms to derive a collection of semantic labels representing
broad topics of content on Tor. Each Tor domain is then assigned a
label by the dominant topic present across the set of all webpages
crawled in the domain.
3.1.1 Topic Modeling. Topic modeling [35] is a method to un-
cover topics as hidden structures within a collection of documents.
By dening a topic as a group of words occurring oen together,
topic modeling creates semantic links among words within the
same context, and dierentiates words by their meaning. LDA [4]
is a widely used unsupervised learning technique for this purpose.
It models a topic tj (1 ≤ j ≤ T ) by a probability distribution p(wi |tj )
over words taken from a corpusD = {d1,d2, · · · ,dN } of documents
where words are drawn from a vocabularyW = {w1,w2, · · · ,wM }.
e probability of observing word wi in document d is dened
as p(wi |d) = ∑Tj=1 p(wi |tj )p(tj |d). Gibbs sampling is used to esti-
mate the word-topic distribution p(wi |tj ) and the topic-document
distribution p(tj |d) from data.
An important hyperparameter is the number of topics T that
should be modeled. We set T by considering the coherence [27] of
a set of topics inferred for some T , choosing the T with the best
coherenceC . C is a function of then words of each ti having highest
probability P(w j |ti ). LetW (t ) = {w1, · · · ,wn } be the set of top-n
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most probable words from P(w |t). en C is given by:
C(t ;W (t )) =
n∑
i=2
i−1∑
j=1
loд
Fd (w(t )i ,w
(t )
j ) + 1
Fd (w(t )j )
where w(t )i ,w
(t )
j ∈W (t ), Fd (w) indicates the number of documents
wherew emerges, and Fd (wi ,w j ) gives the number of documents in
which both wordsw(t )i andw
(t )
j exist. Values closer to zero indicate
higher coherence for the corresponding topic. T is then chosen as
the one that yields the smallest average C over all topics:
arg min
T
 T∑
t=1
C(t ;W (t ))
T

where the summation is ran over a model ed to T topics.
A nal parameter is the minimum length of a document (e.g.
Tor page) for it to be considered in the coherence calculation. We
determine this length empirically by inspection of Figure 2, which
gives topic coherence scores for dierent values of T and dierent
minimum lengths of the documents where n = 10 is considered for
each topic. e trend for T = 9 yields the closest value to zero for
document minimum length of 50 words.
3.1.2 Graph-based Topic Labeling with DBpedia. Word-topic dis-
tributions from a ed topic model are indicative of semantically
related words appearing in common contexts. A human may sub-
sequently assign a label to each topic by manually evaluating this
distribution However, the manual approach yields a subjective, pos-
sibly biased interpretation of the topics present in a corpus. Instead,
we incorporate the unsupervised knowledge graph-based labeling
algorithm GbTL [19]. It utilizes the DBpedia [3] knowledge graph
(KG) which codies Wikipedia articles and their relationships in
the form of an ontology. GbTL nds a concept ζ from DBpedia that
would serve as a suitable label to represent t .
To determine ζ , GbTL denes a suitability measure γ . Before
dening γ , we note that optimizing any measure over all DBpedia
concepts is infeasible due to the massive size of the DBpedia ontol-
ogy. Instead, GbTL considers a candidate set of possible labels for a
topic t . e candidate set for topic t are all vertices in the subgraph
Gt = (Vt ,Et ) of DBpedia whereVt is the set of concepts with labels
identical to any word inW (t ) along with their directed 1st and 2nd
degree neighborhood and Et is the relations among all concepts in
Vt . e choice of 2nd degree neighbors is based on [19] that found
this seing to produce a suciently large candidate set of labels
without adding unrelated ones. Since topic labels can be consid-
ered as assigning classes/categories to the topics, we restrict the
subgraph relations to those of type rdfs:type, dcterms:subject,
skos:broader, skos:broaderOf, and rdfs:sub-ClassOf. e suit-
ability γ of each concept ζ inVt is measured by its Focused Random
Walk Betweenness Centrality measure [19]. is centrality mea-
sures the average amount of time it takes for a random walker to
arrive at some node starting from any other node in a network. It
is computed as follows:
(1) Let L = D −A be the Laplacian matrix ofGt where A is the
adjacency matrix ofGt and D is its diagonal degree matrix.
(2) Arbitrarily remove a row and its corresponding column
from L and then invert it. Dene T as this inverse with
a row and column vector of zeroes inserted at the same
index the row and column was removed from L.
(3) Dene γ (ζ , t) as follows:
γ (ζ , t) =

∑
vx ,vy ∈W (t ),x<y
I
xy
i(n
2
) , if ζ <W (t )∑
vx ,vy ∈W (t ),x<y
I
xy
i
(n−1)(n−2)
2
, otherwise
where Ixyi is given as:
I
(xy)
i =
1
2
∑
vj ∈Vt
Ai j |Ti j −Tiy −Tjx +Tjy |
where i is the index of A corresponding to ζ and Tab is the value
at row a and column b of T . Since DBpedia is a semantic graph,
we assume that vertices playing an important structural role in the
graph should be representative of a concept that binds together the
concepts inW (t ). We use arg maxζ γ (ζ , t) as the label of topic t .
We built the topic models and derived their subsequent labels
using the 7,782 English Tor web pages having more than 50 words.
ese 7,782 pages come from 1,766 unique onion domains and
represents the data we consider in the remainder of our study.3
4 CONTENT EVALUATION
We assigned each domain’s label by the dominant topic in a con-
catenation of all of its constituent pages. Application of LDA to this
set of documents yielded a set of 9 topics. GbTL labeled these topics
Forum, Shopping, Bitcoin, Dream market, Directory, Multimedia,
News, Email service, and Gambling. Table 1 lists the 10 most proba-
ble words per topic. We supplement this with a manual evaluation
of the html code of pages in each domain to beer understand the
meaning of each topic. For domains where we noticed a number
of sub-types identied (e.g. a shopping domain that specialized in
particular types of goods or services), we maintained a count of
sub-type frequencies and show them in Figure 3. We elaborate on
our evaluation of each type of domain below:
Shopping: (359 domains [20.32%]) Shopping domains allow vis-
itors to purchase goods and services, including drugs, medicine,
as well as consultancy and investment services. We found the
dominant shopping service is to provide money transfer to and
from credit cards to buy Visa cards, gi cards, and Bitcoin. Drugs,
pornography, hosting Tor services, and forgery services are other
types of popular shopping domains. e rest includes pages selling
a variety of goods like phone, laptop, movies, and even gold.
Bitcoin: (83 domains [4.7%]) Bitcoin domains provide services
for Bitcoin transactions and fund transfers to wallets. Tor Bitcoin
services dier in terms of the registration process and personal
information needed, registration and transaction fees, the security
platforms they use, and fees compared to surface web counterparts.
Dream market: (235 domains [13.3%]) One shopping domain so
large that it merited its own topic category is the Dream market.
Its pages suggest a wide range of content available for sale, most of
3In the remainder of the paper, for sake of brevity we will sometimes refer to the set
of English Tor domains as simply ‘Tor’ or ‘Tor domains’.
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Table 1: List of 10 most probable words per topic and their label
Label top-10 words
Directory Search, Database, Address, Tor, Browse, URL, Directories, Link, Site, Dir
Bitcoin Btc, Bitcoin, Blockchain, Transaction, Wallet, Deposit, Coin, Buy, Anonymity, Hidden
News Information, Newspaper, News, Tor, Events, Censorship, Web, Press, Tor, Comment
Email PM, Privacy, Massage, Mail, GPG, Cypherpunk, AES, Webmail, IRC, Darkmail
Multimedia Copyright, Book, Video, Music, Free, pdf, Library, TV, FLAC, Paper
Shopping Supplier, Market, Hidden, Commerce, Product, buy, Order, Price, Marketplace, Money
Forum NSFW, Invite, Friend, Group, Share, Private, BBS, IM, Chat, Forum
Gambling Online, Gambling, game, Casino, Loery, Roulee, Table, Value, Money, Play
Dream market Marketplace, Online, Buy, Register, Dream, Support, Hidden, Account, User, Tor
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Figure 3: Services provided bynews,multimedia, forum, and
shopping domains
which are illicit. is includes drugs, stolen data, and counterfeit
consumer goods. Many Dream market pages collected includes
login and registration forms (hence words like “Register”, “Account”,
and “User” emerge in the list of top-10 terms in Table 1) limiting
further access for our crawlers.
Directory: (445 domains [25.19%]) Addresses in Tor are made up of
meaningless combinations of digits and characters that sometimes
change and are hard to memorize. Moreover, most domains may
disappear aer a short amount of time or move to new addresses
[33]. It is thus no surprise to nd directory domains emerge in our
study. Directories are a convenient way of nding Tor domains
without knowing their addresses. Domains labeled as a directory
include unnamed pages with lists of .onion domains along with
the beer known TorDir and e Hidden Wiki services, as well as
search engines like DeepSearch and Ahmia.
Multimedia: (46 domains [2.6%]) Multimedia domains are sites to
download and purchase multimedia products like e-books, movies,
musics, games, and academic and press articles even if they are
copyright protected. Among all multimedia domains, we measured
28% of them to exclusively oer articles and e-books while 22%
oer free download of music or audio les, and to even obtain
login information for stolen TV accounts. e remaining provides
resources like hacked video game accounts, cracked soware, and
a mixture of the above.
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Figure 4: Topic distribution of Tor domains
Forum: (111 domains [6.3%]) Forum domains host bulletin board
and social network services for Tor users to discuss ideas and
thoughts. Among all forums, 72% have a range of topic discus-
sions including information on Tor and its services, hacking, sexual
health, dark net markets, weapons, drugs, and trusted Tor domains.
Some forums require payment via Bitcoin to register.
News: (183 domains [10.36%]) Whereas forums facilitate interac-
tion among Tor users, news domains host pages akin to personal
weblogs where an author writes an essay and visitors can post
follow-up comments. Links to Tor e-mail services are included
to contact post authors. Information on current Tor services and
directories is presented by most news domains, along with politics,
Bitcoin, drug, and Tor security related posts.
Email service: (124 domains [7.02%]) Email domains oer com-
munication services like email, chat room, and Tor VPNs. Email
services vary in the encryption protocol they use, the advertise-
ments they serve for other services, and policies for keeping user
log les. Our investigation nds that many email domains use
secure protocols like SSL, AES, and PGP to secure user accounts
and messages. IRC-based chat rooms are also common. Some email
services charge recurring subscription fees.
Gambling: (180 domains [10.19%]) Gambling domains oer ser-
vices to bet money on games, to purchase gambling advice and
consulting, and to read gambling-related news. Gambling domains
have a number of links to payment processing options including
Ethereum, Monero, DASH, Vertcoin, Visa, and MasterCard.
Figure 4 gives the distribution of topics assigned to each Tor
domain. It illustrates how directory and shopping domains, and
5
Table 2: Summary statistics of the domain network
Statistic Value
Domain count (|V |) 1,766
Hyperlink count (|E |) 5,523
Mean degree (k¯) 12
Max degree (maxk) 389
Density (ρ) 0.0064
W.C.C. Count (|Cw |) 25
S.C.C. Count (|Cs |) 756
Max W.C.C. Size (maxCwi ) 955 (54%)
Max S.C.C. Size (maxCsi ) 13 (0.73%)
the Dream market dominate English domains on Tor by account-
ing for 58.83% of all domain types. is suggests that Tor’s main
utility for users may be to browse information and shop on mar-
ketplaces that require secrecy. In contrast, domains related to the
free exchange of ideas and information (a powerful and positive
use-case of Tor, particular to users in countries facing Internet cen-
sorship [21]), represented by Forum, Email, and News sites, account
for just 23.66% of all domains. It should be noted, however that
services used in countries that most benet from the freedom of
expression of Tor may not be well-represented in our sample. Gam-
bling domains represent a surprisingly large (10.19%) percentage
of domains, suggesting that people may now be turning to Tor to
play online gambling games that are otherwise illegal to host in
many countries around the world. Finally, and perhaps surpris-
ingly, Bitcoin and multimedia domains respectively constitute the
smallest proportion of English Tor domains. Our initial expectation
was that Bitcoin domains would be popular given the prevalence
of the Dream market and shopping domains where purchases are
made via cryptocurrency. We postulate that sites having a Bitcoin
domain may host wallets, search a blockchain, or be markets that
covert currency to BTC. Such sites hence may only need to be vis-
ited infrequently. Moreover, the mainstream popularity of Bitcoin
has led to reputable surface web domains oering similar Bitcoin
services.
5 DOMAIN RELATIONSHIPS
We next examine the structure of relationships between dierent
sources of information on Tor. Such structural analyses realize
the inter and intra-connectivity of domains on Tor conditioned
by the type of information or content they host. e structural
analysis also seeks to identify the topological properties of the Tor
domain network to evaluate similarities and dierences between
the structure and formation process of Tor domains compared to
the surface web and other sociotechnological systems. We build a
graph where vertices are domains and a directed relation means a
page in a domain has a hyperlink to a page in a dierent domain.
We measure simple statistics on the connectivity and connected
components of the graph in Table 2 to make sense of the struc-
ture visualized in Figure 5 (note that all domains with degree 0
are excluded from the gure). e network is sparse, with only
5,523 undirected edges among 1,766 domains and a network density
ρ = 0.006. e network also has |Cw | = 25 weakly connected com-
ponents (W.C.C.) with the largest one having 955 domains. at
Figure 5: Network of domains with degree ¿ 0
only 54% of all vertices fall in the largest W.C.C. is somewhat sur-
prising as many sociotechnological systems including the surface
Web hyperlink graph exhibit a single massive connected compo-
nent that the vast majority of all vertices participate in [5]. is
suggests that the underlying process for linking between websites
is fundamentally dierent than in most sociotechnological systems:
rather than encouraging connections to make information dissemi-
nation easier, the modus operandi of Tor domain owners may be to
discourage linking to other domains, so that information on this
“hidden” web becomes dicult to arbitrarily discover and dissemi-
nate. is hypothesis is further supported by examining the set of
strongly connected components Cs . We measure |Cs | = 756 and
maxCsi = 13, suggesting that an extraordinarily small number of
domains collectively co-link with each other. It may be the case
that the relatively larger |Cw | and maxCwi are simply caused by
directory websites that oer links to a variety of other domains.
ese interesting deviations from other types of Web graphs collec-
tively suggest that information on Tor may be intentionally isolated
and dicult to discover by simple browsing. e small maximum
connected component size speaks to the need of a comprehensive
seed list of domains to for any comprehensive crawl of Tor.
5.1 Connectivity analysis
We next examine hyperlink relationships across domains, within
domains, and the tendency of domains to link to like domains.
5.1.1 Inter-connectivity. To investigate the relationship between
specic domains, we redraw the network with a carpet layout
where vertices are spatially grouped in a grid by their domain type
in Figure 6. We also list the sum of in- and out-degree from each
community to every other community in Figure 7. ere are some
notable domain relationships observed in the two gures. For ex-
ample, we nd a small number of outgoing edges from shopping
to gambling domains (Panel 1 of Figures 6 and 7). Our manual
investigation of these relations nd that some shopping domains
actually provide customers with a method of payment by gambling,
where a customer and seller play an online game to determine
an amount of payment. We further note that shopping websites
are isolated from the Dream market, perhaps to maintain some
distinction between their oerings and the largest marketplace on
Tor [23]. Another interesting observation is that there are a few
number of edges from shopping to Bitcoin domains. Our manual
6
Figure 6: e Tor domain network. Panels 1 through 9 each highlight the incoming and outgoing edges of a particular domain.
e gure is best viewed digitally and in color.
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Figure 7: In/out degree distribution of each community
investigation indicates that in addition to some shopping domains
providing in-person cash payment (usually local drug vendors),
marketplaces that use cryptocurrency for payment tend to link to
providers on the surface web, sometimes with instructions for the
user to purchase cryptocurrency from a trading house or market,
thus explaining the small number of out-going edges from market-
places to Bitcoin domains. Such links to the surface web, however
have been noted as a major Achilles heel to privacy on Tor as a cause
of Tor information leakage [33]. Links incoming to Bitcoin domains
(Panel 2 of Figures 6 and 7) are dominated by directory (≈ 53%)
and email (≈ 32%) domains. is nding defeats our intuition that
marketplaces, the Dream market, and gambling sites would have
been services most reliant on Bitcoin domains. We also investigated
the email domains having edges to Bitcoins and found that many
email services on Tor charge customers for anonymous messaging
services or suggest a donation be made via Tor Bitcoin services.
e sparse relation between multimedia and Bitcoin domains are
due to the fact that some multimedia domains charge users for
the services they provide, and of those, many utilize surface web
cryptocurrency providers.
Other insights can be gleamed from the carpet and inter-domain
degree distributions. For example, the outgoing connections from
Dream market websites (Panel 6 of Figures 6 and 7) show that this
marketplace has very few incoming or outgoing edges to other
domains. Incoming links tend to originate from directory, email,
and forum communities, which could be a byproduct of forum
threads and email links to this secret marketplace. e Dream
market thus appears to be especially siloed on the dark web, despite
the fact that it represents 13.3% of all domains. e outgoing edges
from directory domains (Panel 7 of Figures 6 and 7) indicate that a
large collection of directories on Tor may be sucient to include
sites across all major Tor domains. Email domains exhibit a similar
phenomena (Panel 9 of Figures 6 and 7) where they tend to connect
to all other types of domains. is suggests that Tor e-mail services
are not necessarily exclusive to only marketplace or forum users,
but may be a useful service for most Tor visitors. Finally, we see
that news and forums have no hyperlinks to each other (Panel 4
of Figures 6 and 7 and Panel 8 of Figures 6 and 7) which implies
that although both services are information providers on Tor, they
work independently of each other.
5.1.2 Intra-connectivity. Next, we investigate the connectivity
within each domain to evaluate how tightly knit and accessible
particular types of Tor domains are among each other. is can
reveal how oen domains encourage their visitors to visit other
domains having similar types of content. Figure 8 separately visu-
alizes all intra-domain connections for each domain type. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, Dream market domains are tightly connected com-
pared to others, spliing into only four connected components and
the smallest number of isolated domains. Shopping domains are
7
almost entirely disconnected from each other, indicating that mar-
ketplaces may intentionally disassociate themselves with others.
Gambling, multimedia, and Bitcoin domains are similarly discon-
nected, likely reecting a competition for users within domains that
tend to charge service fees. On the other hand, email, forum, and
directory domains all exhibit a single large connected component.
is implies that in email and directory communities, domains
have more support from each other and refer their visitors to other
similar service providers. News domains have a larger percentage
of isolated domains which implies that most of the news websites
work independently from each other.
Table 3: Rκ for Tor domain networks
Community Rb Rc Rd
Shopping .07 .04 .03
Bitcoin .09 .08 .08
Multimedia .22 .12 .11
News .10 .05 .04
Gambling .11 .06 .06
Dream Market .10 .35 .03
Directory .17 .11 .02
Forum .24 .14 .09
Email .52 .18 .05
We also quantify the intra-connectivity of topic domains by a Ro-
bustness coecientRκ proposed by [31]. is coecient reects the
degree to which a network shaers into multiple connected compo-
nents as vertices and their incident edges are removed. To compute
Rκ , an ordering Oκ is induced on the vertices of the network by a
centrality measure κ such that Oκ (k) gives the vertex with the kth
highestκ centrality. LeingC(κ)i be the size of the largest connected
component of the network aer removing {Oκ (1),Oκ (2), ...,Oκ (i)}
and their incident edges, Rκ is given by:
Rκ =
S1
S2
=
∑ |V |
i=0 i ·C
(κ)
i∑ |V |
i=0 i |V | −
∑ |V |
i=0 i
2
=
6
∑ |V |
i=0 i ·C
(κ)
i
|V |(|V | + 1)(|V | − 1)
Rκ ranges in [0, 1] and smaller values suggest that the network
shaers faster as vertices having high κ betweenness are removed.
e idea behind Rκ ’s formulation is to quantify the change in the
largest network component size C(κ)i as nodes are removed from
the network. e network is ‘maximally robust’ if a plot of C(κ)i
vs the number of nodes removed shows a simple linear decreasing
trend. en the ratio of area under such a plot for a given network,
S1, over the area under the plot for an ideal network, S2, denes the
robustness coecient for that network. Technical details about the
measure are discussed in [31]. Table 3 lists Rκ for each intra-domain
network under Betweenness b, closeness c , and degree d centrality.
d is dened as the undirected degree of a node, b is dened as the
number of shortest paths in the network that a node participates
in, and c is dened as the inverse of the average path length from
the node to all others in its connected component [38].
Studying Table 3 shows a correlation between Rκ and the com-
petitive or cooperative intra-domain behaviors noted above. ere
are some networks whose Rd is close to Rc , namely those commu-
nities that are sparse networks (shopping, Bitcoin, news, gambling,
1:Shopping
4:News
7:Directory
2:Bitcoin
5:Gambling
8:Forum
3:Multimedia
6:Dream Market
9:Email
Figure 8: Intra-relations within domains
multimedia), where competition for users and aention is natural.
For domains where Rc and Rd are dierentiated (directory, email,
forum, Dream market), their structure has fewer connected compo-
nents. is is best illustrated by Dream market where the dierence
of these coecients has its maximum value, while exhibiting the
fewest connected components. Also, we see that for networks with
more supportive interlinking among domains (directory, email, and
forum) the dierence between Rc and Rd are larger.
In comparing Rb between domains, we observe two groups with
similarly small (shopping, Bitcoin, news, Dream market, gambling)
and large (multimedia, directory, forum, email) values. is sug-
gests that the intra-connectivity of domains in the rst group is
dependent on a small percentage of domains, or has a high number
of isolated domains which have zero Betweenness centrality. On
the other hand, high Rb in the second category implies that their
intra-connectivity is more robust to domain failures.
It is worth mentioning that for Dream market, Rb and Rc are
signicantly dierent due to the separated connected components
also seen in Figure 5. Since a high percentage of domains in this
community are located in a single connected component, their
closeness centralities will be greater than zero. On the other hand,
the separated connected components can cause low values for Be-
tweenness centrality since this metric is based on paths between
pairs of domains. is nding also indicates that based on the in-
formation we have from home pages of Dream markets, there exist
separated Dream market communities that link to similar types of
goods and services.
5.1.3 Modularity. Finally, we study the modularity of the net-
work as a means to understand the relationship between the inter-
and intra-domain connectivity conditioned on the content type of
the domain. A domain will have high modularity if it tends to link
to pages of the same content type, and low modularity if it tends to
link to pages of a dierent type. e modularity M of a network is
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Table 4: Modularity score of each topic community
Community M
Dream market 0.452
Directory 0.068
Forum 0.034
Email 0.032
Gambling 0.024
News 0.019
Multimedia 0.017
Shopping 0.012
Bitcoin 0.002
given as [38]:
M =
1
2|E |
∑
i, j
(
Ai j −
didj
2|E |
)
∆typei=typej
where A is a binary network adjacency matrix with Ai j = 1 if vi
and vj are adjacent and di and dj are the undirected degree of
nodes i and j, and ∆E is an indicator that returns 1 if statement
E is true and 0 otherwise. Table 4 shows that Dream market do-
mains exhibit highest modularity by a wide margin, reinforcing
the idea that Dream market domains are largely siloed from all
other domains in the Tor ecosystem. Directories have lower but
non-negligible modularity, leaving the impression that directory
domains weakly cooperate by linking to each other. e remaining
domains have substantially lower modularity; thus the majority of
Tor domains strongly prefer to link to other types. is suggests
that Tor domains prefer to remain isolated within their community
of like domains, electing not to link to domains that oer the same
type of information or services.
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Figure 9: Centrality distributions
5.2 Importance analysis
We further examine the “importance” of particular domains as de-
ned by various measures of network centrality. e centrality
analysis only considers domains having in- or out-degree ≥ 1. We
show the CDF of betweenness centralities bc of domains in Fig-
ure 9a. It shows how virtually every Tor domain has a betweenness
centrality near or lower than 0.05; in fact there are only 6 domains
with betweenness centrality greater than 0.05. ese domains are
the directory HiddenWiki (bc = 0.4) (matching previous reports
suggesting this domain is the principle Tor directory [8]), the Email
domain TorBox (bc = 0.17) and VFEmail (bc = 0.06), a Dream
market domain (bc = 0.07), and two directories in the TorW iki
domain (bc = 0.19 and 0.11 respectively). An aack, removal, or
failure of such directories may thus directly impact the number of
Tor domains reachable by a casual browser exploring this dark web.
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Figure 10: CCDF of network degree distributions
ese domains may further be crucial entry points for probes or
crawlers seeking to map the structure of Tor.
Figure 9b shows the distribution of eigenvector centralities across
Tor domains. We use a histogram rather than a CDF plot to beer
illustrate the variability between centrality values. Eigenvector
centrality [38] describes the structural importance of a node as a
function of the importance of its neighboring nodes. e eigen-
vector centrailty of vertex vi is given by the ith component of the
eigenvector of A whose corresponding eigenvalue is largest. We
nd a heavily skewed distribution of eigenvector centralities where
a majority are close to zero. Further investigation revealed that all
domains with eigenvector centrality ≥ 0.2 are part of the Dream
market. Although high eigenvector centrality does not correlate
with its relative popularity or frequency of visits from users, the
naturally developed organization of Tor’s domain structure places
the Dream market as the most meaningful Tor domain by a wide
margin (note that the highest eigenvector centrality of a non-Dream
market domain is only 0.04). is establishes the Dream market as
the most structurally important, “core” service Tor provides. e
inlet of Figure 9b gives a sense of the distribution for the remain-
ing domains. Here, the distribution exhibits a number of modes
corresponding to connected components of the network that is
disconnected from the Dream market. e especially low eigen-
vector centralities of these domains are further indicative of the
signicance of the Dream market’s structural importance in Tor.
Figure 9c shows the distribution of closeness centralities. Like
eigenvector centrality, we nd a division of domains by those that
exhibit extremely low or high scores, but here the majority of
domains have very high closeness centrality. It is interesting to nd
that most domains exhibit a high closeness centrality despite intra-
connectivity analysis from Section 5.1.2 suggesting that the intra-
connectivity of Tor domains is sparse and has a small largest W.C.C.
is outcome is likely the product of the directories HiddenWiki
andTorW iki having high betweenness centrality that enables many
pairs of domains to be few hops away from each other via these
directories. is underscores the central importance of directory
domains to connect Tor pages across domains, and the fact that Tor
domains tend to remain undiscoverable without directories.
5.3 Scale-free structure
We also investigate signs that the hyperlink structure of domains,
and structure within domains, take on the same scale-free structure
seen in many other sociotechnological systems [1] including the
hyperlink structure of the surface web [5]. Figure 10 show the
CCDF of the degree distributions on log-log scale. e in-degree
distribution does not exhibit a straight line paern indicative of a
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Table 5: Power-tail distribution hypothesis test results
Community In-degree distribution Out-degree distribution
Bitcoin p = .7623,α = 2.69 p = .0114
Forum p = .8996,α = 3.01 p = .0001
Email p = .3377,α = 2.08 p = .0086
News p = .0344 p = .5681,α = 2.73
Directory p = .3407,α = 2.65 p = .0002
Shopping p = .2021,α = 2.85 p = .0001
Gambling p = .0002 p = .0002
Multimedia p = .0003 p = .0002
Dream Market p = .0005 p = .0007
power-law, with a rapid drop in the CCDF occurring in the body of
the distribution around an in-degree of 10. e out-degree distribu-
tion takes on a bimodal paern, with a set of domains having degree
less than 10 and another with degrees between 10 and 100. e
distribution’s paerns may be explained by the variety of inter- and
intra-connectivity paerns observed within each of the domains
studied in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. To quantitatively conrm the
distribution is not a power-law we apply Clauset et al. hypothe-
sis test presented in [10]. e test checks the null hypothesis H0:
the network degree distribution is power-tailed against the alterna-
tive that it is not power-tailed, and provides an estimate of the
power-law exponent α under H0. e test leaves lile doubt that
the in- and out-degree distributions of the network (Figure 10) are
not power-tailed with p = 0.0001, p = 0.056, respectively. If we
consider the edges to be undirected we still have evidence to reject
H0 with p = 0.0003. ese measurements conrm the analysis
presented in [33] that the hyperlink structure of Tor domains does
not have the same scale-free structure as the surface web.
Noting the variety of intra-connectivity paerns discussed in
Section 5.1.2, we also check if the degree distribution of sites within
each domain are power-tailed. ese measurements include intra-
domain connections as well as those connections incident to a
dierent domain. We list the p-value of the test for the in- and
out-degree of each domain in Table 5 and include the estimate of α
when H0 cannot be rejected. Interestingly, we note that it is only
for the in-degree distributions of Bitcoin, forum, email, shopping,
and directory domains, and the out-degree of the news domain,
where there is insucient evidence to reject H0. e popularity of
about half of all Tor domains (where popularity is dened by an
incoming hyperlink) thus has a power-tailed paern suggesting
that a a small number of Bitcoin, forum, email, shopping, and
directories are linked to many times more frequently than is typical.
at the news domain is the only one with a power law out-degree
distribution may suggest the presence of a small number of highly
active news sites that oer posts discussing a far wider variety of
other Tor domains compared to other news domains. e majority
of news domains may thus focus on a specic topic, or are otherwise
used to discuss events outside of the Tor network.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
is paper presented a broad overview of the content of English lan-
guage Tor domains captured in a large crawl of the Tor network. e
paper makes revelations about not the physical or logical (hyper-
link) structure of Tor, but of the particular domains of information
or services hosted on the service and the structure between and
within such domains. Such birds-eye insights, and especially those
related to the inter-connectivity of domains, cannot be acquired
by synthesizing the existing low-level content analysis work that
focuses on a single type of Tor domain. Content analysis carried
out by LDA and GbTL, using measures of topic coherence and label
suitability, identied just nine principal types of domains. Manual
analysis of each domain was done to describe the meaning of each
topic, and any standout ‘sub-types’ seen within them. Over half of
all domains constitute site directories or marketplaces to purchase
and sell goods or services, with money tansfer, drugs, and pornog-
raphy servicing as the most popular types of marketplaces. Our
measurements identied the Dream market as perhaps the ‘core’
service of Tor, as Dream market domains exhibit especially high
closeness and eignevector centralities. e inter-connectivity of the
Tor domain network is surprisingly sparse with a small maximum
W.C.C. but interesting domain inter-connection paerns discussed
in Section 5.1.1. Paerns in the intra-connectivity structure are
further indicative of levels of cooperation (where some pages hy-
perlink to pages in the same domain) and competition (where pages
in a domain are more likely to isolate themselves from pages in the
same domain) that may be measured by robustness coecients Rκ
for varying centrality scores κ. We further note evidence for reject-
ing the hypothesis that the global domain structure is scale-free,
yet there is insucient evidence in the in-degree distributions of
some domain intra-networks and the out-degree distribution of the
news domain intra-network to conclude that these subnetworks are
not power law. is is indicative of dierent underlying processes
that form connections in dierent intra-domain networks.
Future work can expand this study further by replicating our
analysis on Tor pages of dierent languages (chinese, russian, per-
sian), and then by studying topic inter-connectivity between lan-
guage domains, can yield a global perspective into the Tor content
ecosystem. Such analysis can further be replicated on other dark
web services to beer understand why these lesser known services
are used. Another direction of future work is to study the evolution
of the topics and communities over time using a richer topic extrac-
tion analysis based on algorithms discussed in [6, 18]. Finally, the
study can be combined with a modern crawl of similar domains on
the surface web to be able to directly compare and contrast surface
and dark web hyper-link structure. Such a comparative analysis
could shed light around the dierences in use and information
between the surface and dark web.
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